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Abstract 
 
Two groups of participants attempted eight examples of each of four different problem types 
formed by combining insight v. non-insight and verbal v. spatial factors. The groups were 
given different verbalization instructions viz., Silent (N=40) or Direct Concurrent (N=40). 
There were significant differences between insight and non-insight tasks and between spatial 
and verbal tasks in terms of solution rates and latencies. Significant interactions between the 
verbal v. spatial factor and verbalization condition on solution rates and latencies reflected a 
greater (negative) effect of verbalizing on spatial as against verbal problems. However, no 
significant interactions of the insight v. non-insight factor with verbalization condition on 
solution rates or latencies were found. These results favoured the “business as usual” view of 
insight problem solving as against the “special process” view which predicted larger effects 
of verbalization for insight problems as against non-insight problems.  
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Introduction 
 
Problem solving is a key function of the human cognitive system and considerable progress 
has been made in understanding how people solve well defined problems (e.g., the Tower of 
Hanoi tasks) in which the starting conditions, the goal and the possible actions are presented 
clearly and unambiguously (Egan & Greeno, 1974). Such well defined problems can be 
solved by heuristic search within the original representation. However, less progress has 
been made in understanding how people deal with tasks in which the initial way of 
representing the task is misleading and must be changed to permit solution. An example of 
this second type of problem is the 6 matchsticks task (“Given 6 matchsticks on a table make 
4 equilateral triangles.”). This problem normally induces an initial representation within 
which a solution cannot be found. Participants typically search possible configurations of 
matches in two dimensions; however, a change in the problem representation to three 
dimensions is required so that the matches can be formed into a triangular based pyramid 
which meets the goal.  
 
The matchstick problem is an “Insight problem” in which the initial representation has to be 
changed or “re-structured” in order that solution can be attained (Weisberg, 1995). The 
Tower of Hanoi task is an example of a “Non-Insight problem” in that the initial 
representation is adequate to allow solution through search processes.  
 
Explaining how re-structuring occurs remains a major challenge for cognitive theory despite 
a long history of experimental research from the Gestalt psychologists (e.g., Kohler, 1947) to 
more recent information processing approaches (e.g., Ash & Wiley, 2006; Chronicle et al., 
2004; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Ohlsson, 1992). 
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Approaches 
 
Two broad alternative approaches to explaining insight problem solving are currently in 
contention. One approach may be labelled “business as usual” and argues that re-structuring 
in insight problem solving occurs through small incremental and reportable steps that change 
the initial representation following failed attempts (Chronicle et al., 2004; Fleck & 
Weisberg, 2004; MacGregor et al., 2001; Ormerod et al., 2002; Perkins, 1981; Weisberg, 
2006). The second approach may be labelled “special process” and argues that re-structuring 
requires ineffable, un-reportable processes (such as spreading activation, Ohlsson, 1992) that 
operate unconsciously to change the problem representation and lead to solutions which are 
phenomenologically sudden and surprising to the solver (Jung-Beeman, Bowden, Haberman 
et al., 2004; Kohler, 1947; Maier, 1933; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Knoblich et al ., 1999; 
2001; Ollinger, Jones & Knoblich, 2006; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993). 
 
A key method in distinguishing the “business as usual” and the “special process” approaches 
is to examine effects of verbalizing or “thinking aloud” (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Gilhooly 
& Green, 1996) during insight problem solving (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Schooler, Ohlsson 
& Brooks, 1993). According to the “business as usual” view the processes involved in 
solving insight problems are as reportable as those involved in non-insight tasks and 
attempting to verbally report steps taken need not necessarily affect performance. However, 
the “special process” view holds that since the important processes are unconscious and un-
reportable, attempts to verbally report steps during insight problem solving will be disruptive 
and interfere, through “verbal overshadowing”, with the natural course of insight problem 
solving. 
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Types of verbalization 
Before discussing previous findings on verbalization effects in insight tasks, it will be useful 
to briefly distinguish different types of verbalization or thinking aloud. Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) classify verbalization procedures by Time of verbalization (concurrent or 
retrospective) and by Type of verbalization. Three Types of verbalization are distinguished:  
Type 1, where information in a verbal code in focal attention is vocalised directly; Type 2, 
where information in focal attention but not in a verbal code is recoded into a verbal code 
and then vocalised, and Type 3, in which participants are asked to verbalize reasons and 
explanations. Ericsson and Simon (1993, p. xvii) argued that “Type 3 verbalization forces 
subjects to change their thought sequences in order to generate and verbalize overtly the 
information sought.” Hence Type 3 verbalization is a reactive method, which affects 
processing during the task. 
 
 Non-reactive think aloud methods are sought when the aim is to obtain verbal records 
(protocols) to indicate how the target task is normally carried out. On the basis of an 
extensive literature review, Ericsson and Simon concluded that Types 1 and 2 verbalizing  
(which can be labelled together, “concurrent direct verbalizing”) are non-reactive in that they 
do not affect the type of processing people adopt, but they may cause some slowing effects. 
We have also found such non-reactive effects in studies of non-insight problem solving 
(Gilhooly et al., 1997; Gilhooly et al., 1999).  
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Previous studies 
Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks (1993) reported that the effect of verbalization was to depress 
significantly solution rates on insight problems compared to silent controls but that no effect 
of verbalisation was found with non-insight problems. Schooler et al. (1993) interpreted their 
results as indicating that special un-reportable processes were required to solve insight tasks 
and that verbalizing – even when designed to be minimally reactive – interfered by biasing 
processing into verbalizable conscious forms. 
 
Although the study has been very influential, a number of aspects of Schooler et al.’s (1993) 
research are problematic. It may be noted that in Schooler et al.’s (1993) key Experiments 3 
and 4, the four non-insight problems were predominantly verbal in character while at least 
two of the three insight problems used (triangle of coins and the rope problem) could be 
regarded as having a large spatial element. Verbalization effects would be expected to be 
stronger for spatial problems than for verbal problems because verbalization would tend to 
induce a switch from more appropriate spatial coding to a less appropriate verbal coding. 
Hence, Schooler et al.’s (1993) results could be at least partly due to a confounding of the 
insight v. non-insight factor with the verbal v. spatial factor. 
 
The exact instructions used for verbalising might also be a factor in Schooler et al.’s (1993) 
finding. Ericsson and Simon (1993, p. xxx) noted that Schooler et al.’s (1993) verbalization 
instructions in the key experiments on effects of verbalising were not quite standard for 
concurrent direct verbalization. In Schooler et al.’s (1993) Experiments 3 and 4 in which the 
think aloud instructions were intended to lead to direct concurrent reporting, participants 
were told to verbalize “anything you read, questions you ask yourself and so forth” and it 
may be that participants were thus cued to read the problem statement more often than 
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control participants and hence the initial interpretation might become stronger and more 
resistant to change. 
 
Fleck and Weisberg (2004) pointed out that the training given for thinking aloud by Schooler 
et al. (1993) was very brief and the only practice task given to familiarise participants with 
direct concurrent think aloud was a non-insight task. Thus, think aloud training may have 
been insufficient to overcome pre-existing tendencies to explain and justify solution attempts 
and use of a non-insight practice problem may have biased participants to treat the 
subsequent insight problems as if they were non-insight tasks. Some support for these views 
emerged from Fleck and Weisberg’s (2004) protocol analysis study of a single insight task, 
viz., Duncker’s (1945) candle problem. Using instructions close to Ericsson and Simon’s 
ideal for non-reactive verbalizing and more extensive think aloud training than Schooler et 
al. (1993), Fleck and Weisberg (2004) found no effect of direct concurrent think aloud (N = 
34) v. silent controls (N = 18) for the candle problem.  Weisberg (2006, p.334) also reported 
no effects of direct concurrent think aloud in a study of three insight tasks with Ns of 55 in 
both control and experimental groups. 
 
Finally, the number of tasks exemplifying insight and non-insight problems in Schooler et 
al.’s (1993) study was relatively small (three insight v. four non-insight) and this raises 
questions about the representativeness of the task sample and the reliability of composite 
scores based on the example items.  
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Present Study 
 
 The possible existence of verbal overshadowing in insight tasks is important for establishing 
the nature of the processing underlying insight problem solving, and for assessing the utility 
of think aloud methods in studying insight problem solving. However, the evidence base is 
problematic, in that verbalization effects had been studied in very few insight problems 
(three in Schooler et al.’s (1993) main studies and one in Fleck & Weisberg (2004)). Further, 
it is not completely clear whether Schooler et al.’s (1993) verbalization instructions were 
truly direct concurrent (Type 1 or 2)  or Type 3 and there was a possible confounding of 
verbal/spatial factors with insight/non-insight in their studies. Hence, the present experiment 
examined possible effects of verbalizing using clearly direct concurrent verbalization 
methods and a considerably larger set of problems than hitherto. Moreover, the problem set 
used in the present study included spatial and verbal insight and non-insight problems as a 
check on whether effects may be stronger for spatial problems. Eight problems representing 
each combination of insight/non-insight and spatial/verbal factors were used, giving 32 
problems in total. Verbalization instructions followed Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) 
guidelines and appropriate levels of training in verbalization procedures were given. Overall, 
the “business as usual view” would predict no effect of direct concurrent verbalizing on 
insight or non-insight tasks; the “special process” view of insight would predict impairing 
effects of direct concurrent verbalising on insight problems but no effect of direct concurrent 
verbalising on non-insight tasks. Verbalising might be expected to have some impairing 
effect on spatial tasks because participants would have to encode spatial representations into 
verbal form. The experiment was a mixed design with one between factor (Verbalization 
instructions) and two within factors (Insight v. Non-insight; Verbal v. Spatial). 
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Method 
Materials 
The problems used here were largely drawn from a set investigated in a previous study 
(Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). To make equal numbers of tasks in the four categories formed 
by combining insight v. non-insight and verbal v. spatial some additional problems not used 
in Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) were added. Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) reported a cluster 
analysis which supported the distinction between insight and non-insight problems. It was 
also found in this study that individual differences in vocabulary were associated with better 
performance on tasks classed as verbal insight and differences in spatial flexibility were 
associated with better performance on tasks classed as spatial insight tasks. These findings 
support the distinction between spatial and verbal insight problems.  
The problems used were as follows: 
8 verbal insight problems viz.,Ocean (At noon a ship’s porthole is 4 metres above the 
waterline. The tide rises at 1 metre per hour. How long will it take the water to reach the 
porthole?), Football (Joe has no psychic powers but he can tell you the score in any football 
game before it starts. How?), Socks (There are of black and brown socks in a drawer mixed 
in ratio of 4 to 5. How many socks would you have to take out without looking to be sure of 
getting a pair of the same colour?), Earth (How much earth is there in a hole 2m by 3m by 
2m?),  Lake (Someone walked for 20 mins. on the surface of a lake without sinking but 
without any floatation aid. How?) , Lilies (The Lilies in a lake double in number everyday. 
The lake will be covered in 60 days. In how many days will it be half covered?) , Horse 
trading (A man buys a horse for £60, sells it for £70, buys it back for £80 and finally sells it 
again for £90. How much has he made?), Reading (A man is reading a book when the lights 
go off. Although the room is pitch dark the man goes on reading. How?). 
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8 spatial insight problems viz., Triangle of coins (Given coins in a triangle shape with 1, 2, 3, 
4 coins in the rows, move 3 coins so that the triangle faces the other way.), Pigpen (9 pigs 
are kept in a square pen. Build 2 more square enclosures that would put each pig in a pen by 
itself.) , 6 matches (see above), Cake problem (Given a circular cake can you cut it into 8 
equal pieces using only 3 straight cuts?), Cheap necklace (A woman has four pieces of chain. 
Each piece is made up of 3 links. She wants to join the pieces into a single closed ring of 
chain. To open a link costs 2 cents and to close a link costs 3 cents. She has only 15 cents. 
How does she do it?), 8 coins (transform an arrangement of 8 coins into one where each coin 
touches exactly 3 others), Farm (How could you divide an L-shaped piece of land into 4 
equally shaped pieces of equal sizes?), Cherry (Given 4 matches arranged to represent a 
glass and a dot representing a cherry in the glass, move 2 matches so cherry is outside the 
glass). 
 
8 verbal non-insight problems viz., Suspects (Given statements by 4 suspects infer which one 
committed the crime), Plan Day (Devise optimal plan to complete errands given travelling 
times and opening hours of various shops), Dinner party (Given 5 guests with specified food 
aversions and a list of foods, make up a menu all could eat), Couples (Given information 
about what colours members of couples were wearing, infer what colour a specific individual 
is wearing), Anagrams (unscramble 8 five-letter single solution anagrams), Bachelors (Given 
constraints on what each of 5 bachelors can eat and days they can host a dinner deduce 
which bachelor hosted dinner on each weekday night of the week), Pint (Given containers of 
varying sizes get a specified quantity of water), Flowers (Given limited information about 
flowers given from four male to four female partners deduce who gave which flowers to 
whom). 
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8 spatial non-insight problems viz., Hobbits & Orcs (Given a boat that can only hold 2 
creatures, how can you get 3 hobbits and 3 orcs across a river in such a way that the hobbits 
are never outnumbered in  minimum moves), Ward-Allport Tower of London (Manipulate 5  
differently coloured discs on equal size pegs to match target configuration in minimum 
moves), 4-disc Tower of Hanoi, Raven’s Matrices, Cards (Given limited  information deduce 
spatial layout of cards on a table), Heavy/light coins (Given 4 coins of which 2 are slightly 
light and 2 are slightly heavy, find out which are which in 2 weighings on a balance scale), 
Peg solitaire (Remove as many pegs as possible; pegs jumped over are removed), Wolf and 
chicken (Move a wolf, chicken and cabbage from one side of river to another subject to 
constraints). 
 
Participants:  80 students at University of Hertfordshire. (36 male; 44 female; Mean age 
=22.01 yrs, SD = 3.70 yrs). Participants were paid £7 per hour for 2 x 2hrs sessions. 
 
Procedure: Participants were assigned randomly to a Concurrent Direct think aloud group (N 
= 40) or to a Silent Working Control group (N = 40). 
Problems were presented in random orders. Verbalizations were digitally recorded for 
protocol analyses which will be reported in a separate paper. 
Direct concurrent think aloud instructions were as follows- 
“In this experiment we are interested in what you think about when you find answers to some 
problems that I am going to ask you to answer. In order to do this I am going to ask you to 
think aloud as you work on each problem. What I mean by think aloud is that I want you to 
tell me everything you are thinking from the time you first see the question until you give an 
answer. I would like you to talk aloud constantly from the time I present each problem until 
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you have given your final answer to the question. I don’t want you to try to plan out what 
you say or try to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you are alone in the 
room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep talking. If you are silent for 
any long period of time I will ask you to talk. Do you understand what I want you to do?” 
Any questions were then answered. 
“Good, now we will begin with some practice problems.” 
 
The order of practice problems was randomised. Two practice tasks were insight problems 
and two were non-insight tasks. 
 
Practice problems:  
1. I want you to multiply two numbers in your head and tell me what you are thinking 
as you get an answer. What is the result of multiplying 24 x 15? 
2.  How many windows are there in your parents’ house? 
3. Two men play 5 games of chess and each wins an even number of games without any 
ties. How could that be? 
4. A woman didn’t have any driving insurance. She didn’t stop at a railway crossing and 
went the wrong way down a one way street for hundreds of yards. A policeman saw 
all this but did nothing. Why?” 
 
A prompt was given after 15s silence “Please keep talking”. 
 
All participants were tested individually and attempted all tasks (presented in random 
orders). Experimenter confined feedback for proposed solutions by saying only “Yes, that is 
the solution” or “No, that is not the solution. Please keep trying.”  
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A maximum time of 4 mins was allowed per problem.  
  
Results 
Solution rates by problems 
Since averaging data over problems might obscure differences among problems and to 
identify tasks that may display floor or ceiling effects we first analysed average solution rates 
within 4 mins for each problem by verbalization condition, as shown in Table 1 below.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
From Table 1 it can be seen that out of 32 F- test comparisons between solution rates with 
and without verbalising, only three  (Lilies, Socks, Raven) were significant at the .05 level (2 
tail). A simple tally of number of comparisons for each problem type in the direction 
predicted by the overshadowing hypothesis out of eight indicates that for Verbal Insight the 
tally was 2/8, for Spatial Insight it was 7/8, for Verbal Non-Insight it was 1/8 and for Spatial 
Non-Insight it was 7/8. Thus, a verbal overshadowing effect was present for 14/16 of spatial 
tasks and for 3/16 verbal tasks, which yielded a χ2(1) = 15.18, p <0.001, φ = .69. However, a 
verbal overshadowing effect was only present for 9/16 insight and 8/16 non-insight tasks 
indicating no significant association of verbal overshadowing with whether a task was 
insight or not (χ2(1) = 0.12, ns, φ = .06). Overall, these tallies suggest that the verbalisation 
effect is largely confined to Spatial problems and is not affected by whether the problems are 
of the Insight type or not. 
 
 Solution rates by problem types 
We combined the problem scores into composite averages over examples of each type. Since 
a few problems showed floor effects (Cheap Necklace, Coins, Matches, Tower of Hanoi) or 
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ceiling effects (Horse, Couples) these were omitted from the composite scores per problem 
types. A problem was considered to show a floor effect if the control solution rate was less 
than .20 and a ceiling effect if the control solution rate was greater than .80. The resulting 
average solution rates per problem type are shown in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
A 2x2x2 factorial Anova with two within factors (Insight/Non-insight and Spatial/Verbal), 
and one between factor (Verbalization condition: Silent and Direct Concurrent 
Verbalization) was carried out with solution probability scores averaged over problem types 
as the dependent variable.  
It was found that there were significant differences between Insight and Non-Insight 
problems (F (1,78) = 17.79, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .19) and between Verbal and Spatial 
problems (F (1,78) = 82.3, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .51) in average difficulty levels. Overall, in 
this set of problems, the Non-insight tasks and the Spatial tasks were somewhat more 
difficult than the Insight and the Verbal tasks respectively. However, the results indicated 
that there was no main effect of Verbalization condition (F (1,78) = 0.15, ns) and, 
importantly, no interaction effect between the Insight factor (Insight v Non-insight) and 
Verbalization condition on solution rates (F (1,78) = 1.63, ns). Thus, these results replicate 
the lack of verbalization effects on insight tasks reported by Fleck & Weisberg (2004) and 
Weisberg (2006, p.334) and counter the finding of such effects by Schooler et al. (1993).  
There was a significant interaction effect between the Verbal/Spatial problem factor and 
Verbalization condition on solution rates (F (1,78) = 4.57, p < 0.05, partial η2 = .06).  It may 
be noted that there was no three-way interaction between the Insight factor (Insight v Non-
Insight), the Verbal/Spatial factor and the Verbalization condition on solution rates (F (1,78) 
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= 1.67, ns). The pattern of the interaction in Table 2 suggests that the spatial problems were 
somewhat impaired by verbalizing but verbal problems were somewhat aided by verbalizing. 
 
 
Latencies by problems 
As latencies may be regarded as more sensitive measures of solving success than 
correct/incorrect measures (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005), analyses were also carried out on 
latencies (non-solutions = 240s). Latencies per problem type and verbalization condition are 
shown in Table 3 below. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
From Table 3 it can be seen that out of 32 F test comparisons between solution rates with 
and without verbalising, only one (Dinner) was significant at the .05 level (2 tail) and this 
result was opposite in direction to the overshadowing hypothesis. A simple tally of number 
of comparisons for each problem type in the direction predicted by the overshadowing 
hypothesis out of eight indicates that for Verbal Insight the tally was 2/8, for Spatial Insight 
it was 8/8, for Verbal Non-Insight it was 1/8 and for Spatial Non-Insight it was 7/8. Thus, a 
verbal overshadowing effect was present for 15/16 of spatial tasks and for 3/16 verbal tasks, 
which indicated a χ2(1) = 18.28, p <0.001, φ = .76. However a verbal overshadowing effect 
was only present for 10/16 insight and 8/16 non-insight tasks indicating no significant 
association of verbal overshadowing with whether a task was insight or not (χ2(1) = 0.51, ns, 
φ= .13). Overall, analysis of these tallies, as with the solution rate analyses, suggests again 
that the verbalisation effect is largely confined to Spatial problems and is not affected by 
whether the problems are of the Insight type or not.    
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 Latencies by problem types 
The average latencies per problem type and verbalisation condition are shown in Table 4.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
A 2x2x2 factorial Anova with two within factors (Insight/Non-insight and Spatial/Verbal), 
and one between factor (Verbalization condition: Silent and Direct concurrent verbalization) 
was carried out with latencies averaged over problem types as the dependent variable.  
 
It was found that there were significant differences between Insight and Non-Insight 
problems  (F (1,78) = 30.73, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .28) and between Verbal and Spatial 
problems  (F (1,78) = 175.29, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .69) in average latency scores. Overall, in 
this set of problems, the Non-insight tasks and the Spatial tasks scored higher on the latency 
measure than the Insight and the Verbal tasks respectively. It was found that, as with the 
solution data, there was no main effect of Verbalization condition   ( F (1,78) = 0.16, ns) and 
no interaction effect between the Insight factor (Insight v Non-insight) and Verbalization 
condition  ( F (1,78) = 1.01, ns) on latencies. Thus, these results again replicate the lack of 
verbalization effects on insight tasks reported by Fleck & Weisberg (2004) and Weisberg 
(2006, p.334) and counter the hypothesis that verbalisation effects would be particularly 
strong for insight latencies. There was an interaction effect between the Verbal/Spatial 
problem factor and Verbalization condition on latencies (F (1,78) = 6.20, p < 0.01, partial η2 
= .07). It may be noted that there was no three-way interaction between the Insight factor 
(Insight v Non-Insight), the Verbal/Spatial factor and the Verbalization condition on 
latencies (F (1,78) = 0.07, ns). The interaction pattern shown in Table 3 suggests that spatial 
problems were slowed to a greater extent by verbalizing than were verbal problems. 
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Analysis of simple effects of verbalization condition on latencies found a significant 
impairing effect for spatial tasks, F(1,78) = 3.67, p < 0.05, partial η2 = .04 but no effect for 
verbal tasks, F(1,78) = 2.78, ns. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
On the “special process” view of insight put forward by Schooler et al. (1993), Ohlsson 
(1992), Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and others, according to which insight problem solving 
involves un-reportable processes, we would have expected to find a significant interaction of 
insight v. non-insight problem type with verbalization condition, with particularly negative 
effects of Concurrent Direct verbalization on insight tasks. On the “business as usual” view 
put forward by Perkins (1981), Fleck and Weisberg (2004) and others, it would be expected 
that direct concurrent verbalization would not differentially affect insight v. non-insight 
problems. 
 
Overall, the lack of interactions found in the present study between the Insight factor and 
Verbalization condition on solution rates and latencies supports the “business as usual” view 
and does not support the “special process” view that un-verbalizable processes are 
particularly involved in insight problem solving. It may be argued that the present report is 
relying on a null result and that such a result may be due to a lack of statistical power in the  
study reported here. One may note that Schooler et al.’s (1993) key interaction results 
showed a 35% difference between solution rates for insight tasks under verbalising v. silent 
conditions. This difference in proportions translates into an effect size (h) of .54 which is a 
medium sized effect (Cohen, 1988). The interaction of Problem Type X Verbalisation, 
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F(1,38) = 5.22, reported by Schooler et al. (1993, p.174) represents a partial eta
2
 of 0.12, 
which again translates into a medium sized effect. Thus, Schooler et al. (1993) obtained a 
significant medium sized Problem Type X Verbalisation interaction with group Ns of 20. 
The present study was more powerful than Schooler et al. (1993), in that its group Ns were 
40 rather than 20. Furthermore, the composite measures used were more reliable, being 
based on 8 items each as against the 3 or 4 used by Schooler et al. (1993), which increases 
the power of the present study. Overall, the absence of a Problem Type X Verbalisation 
interaction in the present study cannot be easily attributed to lack of power as compared to 
Schooler et al. (1993).  
A further difference between the present study and that of Schooler et al. (1993) is that the 
problem types in Schooler et al. varied markedly in difficulty, such that their insight 
problems were easier. In Schooler et al.’s Experiment 3 they reported c. 80% correct on 
insight tasks in silent control conditions and c. 45% correct on non-insight tasks in silent 
control conditions. A possible interpretation is that verbal overshadowing affects easy 
problems perhaps by delaying an obvious answer. However, in the present study the 
difficulties of the insight and non-insight problems were quite well matched at 57% and 45% 
correct respectively in silent control conditions. The spatial problems in the present study 
were somewhat more difficult than the verbal problems with 45% and 59% solving 
respectively in silent control conditions. The present finding of verbal overshadowing in the 
harder spatial problems but not in the easier verbal problems suggests that Schooler et al.’s 
result was not due to a confounding of difficulty with the insight status of the tasks.    
We suggest that the previous results which indicated verbal overshadowing in insight 
problem solving were largely due to confounding of insight and spatial task factors. Thus, 
the significant interactions of the Verbal v. Spatial problem factor with Verbalization 
condition on solution rates and latencies in the present study are consistent with the view that 
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previous reports of impairing effects of verbalizing in insight tasks (Schooler et al., 1993) 
may have reflected a confounding of insight tasks with spatial tasks; such tasks are generally 
impaired by verbalization because of the need to re-code spatial information into verbal form 
for reporting purposes (Ericsson and Simon, 1993, pp. xix –xxii). An examination of the 
degree to which individual problems matched the predictions of overshadowing indicated 
that such predictions are generally accurate in direction for spatial tasks but not for verbal 
tasks irrespective of whether the tasks involved insight or not.  
 
In terms of theoretical issues regarding insight, the present results suggest that insight 
problem solving does not depend on processes that are disrupted by verbalisation. This 
conclusion offers support to the usefulness of verbal protocol methods in studying insight 
problem solving. The exact processes involved in restructuring under the “business as usual” 
view need further clarification. Explicit heuristic search processes aimed at changing the 
problem space as suggested by Kaplan and Simon (1990) are candidates for further research. 
For example, solvers could deliberately decide to examine each word in a verbal insight 
problem for ambiguity in order to seek an alternative interpretation. Such explicit processes 
would be expected to  involve the central executive of working memory and support for the 
role of executive processes has been found in a number of individual difference studies of 
insight problem solving (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Murray & Byrne, 2005; Fleck, 2008; 
Ash & Wiley, 2006).  
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Table 1: Mean solution rates and SDs in brackets, over 4 minute trials by problem and 
verbalization condition, inferential statistics (F, exact 2-tail p and partial η2) for verbalisation 
effects. * = p < .05, 2 tail.
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Problem   Silent     Think aloud F(1,78) 2 tail p  Partial η2 
Verbal Insight  
Earth   .73 (.45) .78 (.42) 0.26  .61     .003 
Football  .38 (.49) .45 (.50) 0.46  .50     .006 
Horse   .85 (.36) .90 (.50) 0.45  .51    .006  
Lake   .70 (.46) .78 (.42) 0.57  .45   .007 
Lilies   .70 (.46) .48 (.51) 4.29  .04*    .052 
Ocean   .53 (.51) .65 (.48) 1.28  .26      .016  
Reading  .73 (.45) .75 (.44) 0.06  .80     .001 
Socks   .80 (.40) .60 (.49) 3.90  .04*      .048  
 
Spatial Insight 
Cake   .50 (.51) .35 (.48) 1.84  .18      .023 
Cherry   .43 (.50) .33 (.47) 0.84  .36      .011 
Cheap necklace .13 (.34) .03 (.16) 2.92  .09      .036 
Coins   .13 (.34) .10 (.31) 0.12  .73      .002         
Farm   .53 (.51) .63 (.49) 0.81  .37      .010 
Matches  .05 (.22) .00 (.00) 2.05  .16      .026 
Pigpen   .33 (.47) .23 (.42) 0.99  .32      .013 
Triangle  .65 (.48) .58 (.49) 0.46             .50      .006
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Table 1 (Continued): Mean solution rates and SDs in brackets, over 4 minute trials by 
problem and verbalization condition, inferential statistics (F, exact 2-tail p and partial η2) for 
verbalisation effects. * = p < .05, 2 tail.
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Problem   Silent     Think aloud F(1,78) 2 tail p  Partial η2 
Verbal Non-Insight 
Bachelors  .33 (.49) .38 (.49) 0.22  .64     .003 
Couples  .88 (.34) .85 (.36) 0.10  .75     .001 
Day   .70 (.46) .78 (.42) 0.57  .45    .007  
Dinner   1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00) ----  ---   --- 
Flower   .70 (.46) .80 (.42) 1.05  .31    .013 
Pint   .70 (.46) .70 (.46) 0.00  1.00      .000 
Suspects  .40 (.49)  .55 (.50) 1.80  .18     .023  
Anagrams  .64 (.27) .69 (.26) 0.47  .68      .002  
 
Spatial Non-Insight 
Heavy/light coins .58 (.50) .55 (.50) 0.05  .82  .001 
Peg   .59 (.28) .47 (.26) 2.28  .13  .029 
Cards   .50 (.51) .53 (.51) 0.05  .83  .001 
Tower of Hanoi .18 (.38) .18 (.38) 0.00  1.00  .000         
Wolf   .80 (.41) .65 (.48) 2.23  .14       .028 
Hobbits & Orcs .65 (.26) .59 (.28) 1.21  .28  .015  
Raven   .54 (.28) .41 (.27) 4.81  .03*  .058  
Tower of London .44 (.42) .55 (.29) 2.41  .13  .030 
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Table 2: Mean solution probabilities over 4 minute trials by problem type and verbalization 
condition, averaged over problems per type. (SDs in brackets). 
 
       PROBLEM    TYPE 
     Insight     Non-insight 
    Verbal  Spatial   Verbal  Spatial  
VERBALIZATION   
 
Silent (N=40)  .65   (.24) .49  (.31)  .54  (.25) .41  (.22) 
 
Think aloud (N=40)  .64  (.25) .42  (.24)  .61  (.22) .35  (.16) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3: Mean latencies in secs., by problem and verbalization condition, inferential statistics 
(F, exact 2-tail p and partial η2) for verbalisation effects. * = p< .05, 2 tail. N=40. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Problem   Silent     Think aloud F(1,78) 2 tail p  Partial η2 
Verbal Insight  
Earth   98.0 (99.2) 94.9 (93.1) 0.02  .88     .000 
Football  160.8 (104.8) 151.4 (100.8) 0.16  .69     .002 
Horse   115.9 (72.8) 92.9 (75.9) 1.91  .17    .024  
Lake   93.2 (99.7) 82.2 (94.6) 0.26  .61   .003 
Lilies   137.0 (86.8) 161.7 (94.1) 1.48  .23    .019 
Ocean   157.6 (87.4) 151.6 (84.5) 0.09  .75      .001  
Reading  103.5 (95.3) 96.5 (95.5) 0.11  .74     .001 
Socks   126.4 (79.9) 152.8 (83.6) 2.09  .15   .026  
 
Spatial Insight 
Cake   174.4 (86.7) 196.8 (72.6) 1.56  .21       .020 
Cherry   178.3 (81.8) 198.2 (68.0) 1.39  .24      .018 
Cheap necklace 235.1 (16.7) 239.9 (0.7) 3.23  .08        .040 
Coins   228.3 (36.5) 229.9 (36.2) 0.04  .84       .001         
Farm   177.05 (72.5) 179.7 (65.9) 0.03  .87      .000 
Matches  236.3 (17.7) 240.0 (0.0) 1.82  .18      .023 
Pigpen   201.9 (66.7) 216.3 (47.2) 1.25  .27       .016 
Triangle  149.7 (82.1) 175.5 (77.6) 2.08             .15       .026
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Table 3 (Continued): Mean latencies in secs., by problem and verbalization condition, 
inferential statistics (F, exact 2-tail p and partial η2) for verbalisation effects.* = p<.05, 2-tail. 
N =40. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Problem   Silent     Think aloud F(1,78) 2 tail p  Partial η2 
Verbal Non-Insight 
Bachelors  222.4 (30.2) 217.9 (33.1) 0.39  .53     .005 
Couples  79.2 (44.9) 65.9 (24.4) 2.69  .11     .033 
Day   90.4 (46.5) 77.5 (42.3) 1.69  .19    .021  
Dinner   87.2 (39.5) 70.2 (23.2) 5.49  .02*   .066 
Flower   166.9 (57.8) 153.9 (50.9) 1.14  .29    .014 
Pint   147.3 (86.5) 140.1 (81.1) .14  .71      .002 
Suspects  211.5 (56.1)  196.9 (55.1) .14  .71     .002 
Anagrams  116.2 (16.5) 119.3 (3.5) 1.34  .25      .017  
 
Spatial Non-Insight 
Heavy/light coins 183.9 (61.5) 180.9 (67.5) 0.04  .84  .001 
Peg   134.8 (49.1) 145.9 (58.4) 0.84  .36  .011 
Cards   186.4 (84.4)    200.5 (54.8) 1.11  .29  .014 
Tower of Hanoi 126.0 (58.7) 128.28 (63.3) 0.03  .87  .000         
Wolf   125.9 (75.4) 150.8 (76.9) 2.13  .15       .027 
Hobbits & Orcs 28.6 (10.7) 25.12 (12.0) 1.65  .20  .021  
Raven   36.7 (11.8) 38.69 (11.3) .61  .44  .008  
Tower of London 31.56 (9.1) 35.32 (12.7) 2.30  .13  .029 
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Table 4: Mean latencies in secs., by problem type and verbalization condition, averaged over  
problems per type. (SDs in brackets.).  
       PROBLEM  TYPE.  
 
     Insight     Non-insight 
 
    Verbal  Spatial   Verbal  Spatial  
VERBALIZATION   
 
Silent (N=40)  124.08  176.25   153.44  142.06 
    (52.59) (35.65)  (30.77) (28.63) 
  
Think aloud (N=40)  123.01  193.25    145.17 149.63 
    (49.92) (22.61)  (23.68) (30.96) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
